
Relative Timing Based Verification of Concurrent Systems

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Outline

- PART I: Motivation and background
- PART II: Formal verification with relative timing
- PART III: Compositional verification
- PART IV: Conclusions and future work


Motivation: the problem

- System's complexity: continuous growth in scale and functionality
- Probability to introduce design errors increases
- System failures are unacceptable:
 - 1994: Floating point divider unit of Pentium μ P
 - 1996: Launch failure of Ariane 5 rocket
- **Simulation:** General bug-finding techniques
- **Formal verification:** Exhaustive coverage

Simulation

- Predominant verification method: intuitive idea
- Construction of test-cases: manually, randomly, etc.
- Cannot be exhaustive: "*Heisenbug*" paradigm, corner-cases, infinite cases, ...

Simulation methodology:




Formal verification

- **Mathematical/Algorithmic** methods to determine correctness:
 - Formal model of the system
 - Formal specification language (e.g. some logic)
 - Exhaustive reasoning method
- Ensures consistency with specification for **all** possible input patterns

Formal verification methodology...




Model checking



- The checker enumerates **all** the states of the system
- Combinatorial **state explosion**: 32 bit register has 2^{32} states
- **Symbolic** methods, partial orders, abstractions, etc.
- Many automatic tools and success stories exist



State space exploration

- Example:




- Initial state:
 - $a = 1, b = c = d = 0$
 - a is about to fall

State space exploration




- FSM-like model: Transition system
 - ? State, transitions, events
- State space exploration
 - ? Initial state + transition relation
 - ? Iterative until fix-point
- Combinatorial state explosion problem

Symbolic methods




- Using $v_1 v_2 \dots v_n$ Boolean variables, a state is a *minterm* in B^n
- Sets of states and transitions are Boolean functions in B^n
- Boolean functions represented as **Binary Decision Diagrams** (Bryant): worst-case exponential, but efficient in practice

Symbolic methods



Symbolic methods




Appropriate for untimed systems...

Timed systems


- Symbolic methods are mature for untimed systems
- Timed systems: correct behavior depends on timing characteristics of the system:
 - RTOSs: e.g. reaction to interrupts within a time frame
 - Communication protocols: e.g. time-out conditions
 - Aggressive circuit designs for performance
 - GALS-type systems: e.g. bridge of clock domains
- Time introduces new sources of exponentiality
- Conventional verification techniques do not apply

Timed systems

- Example:



Timed systems



- **Timed transition system**
(Manna, Pnueli)

- Transition system
- Min/Max delay bounds

$$d(a-) \in [1, 2]$$

$$d(b+) \in [1, 2]$$


$$d(c+) \in [1, 3]$$

$$d(d+) \in [2, 3]$$

$$d(a+) \in [1, 2]$$

...

Exact timed state space




Exact timed state space


- Timed automata (Dill, Alur, Courcoubetis, ...):
 - Finite automaton to describe the control
 - Real-valued **clocks** to model quantitative timing constraints
 - COSPAN, KRONOS, UPAAL, MOCHA, ...
- Clock regions and region automata (Dill, Alur, ...):
 - Equivalence class of *clock valuations*
 - Sensible to the number of clocks and the delay bounds
- Zone automata:
 - Collapse groups of regions into convex geometric regions
 - Difference Bound Matrices (Dill)
- **Symbolic methods not easily applicable:**
 - Difference Bound Matrices and BDDs (Dill, Balarin, ...)
 - Discrete counters and NDDs: OpenKRONOS (Bozga, Maler, ...)

Relative timing


Relative timing




- Delays impose:
 - $d+$ cannot fire in s_2
 - $d+$ is only firable in s_4
 - $b+$ always fires before $d+$
- Concurrency reduction by imposing relative orderings



Relative timing



- Lazy Transition System (Cortadella, et al.)
 - $d+$ is lazy w.r.t. $b+$
 - Explicit distinction between enabling and firing
 - Conservative overestimation of the timed state space



GOAL of the thesis

GOAL of the thesis

- “Model-checking-like” approach for the verification of **safety** properties in **timed** systems
 - Safety properties (invariants): “an undesired behavior *never occurs*”
 - Satisfiability of the properties depends of timing characteristics of the system
 - Example: no spurious/undesired events in a circuit
- Some problems:
 - State explosion
 - Time dimension
 - Algorithmic complexity
- Some solutions:
 - Symbolic representation
 - Relative timing
 - Incremental approach

GOAL of the thesis


- System model: Timed Transition Systems (TTS)
- Safety properties (modeled as Boolean invariants)
- Relative timing: Lazy Transition Systems (LzTS)
- LzTSs can be represented using BDDs \Rightarrow large systems
- Iterative **incremental refinement** of the untimed domain:
 - Localized analysis of property violations,
 - Off-line absolute timing analysis, and
 - Incorporation of **Relative Timing** constraints
- **Back-annotation**: counterexample trace or sufficient relative timing constraints for correctness are reported

PART II

Formal verification with relative timing

- System model
- From absolute to relative timing
- State space refinement by timing constraints
- Overall verification approach
- Experimental results

System model



- Timed Transition system
 - Transition system
 - Min/Max delay bounds

$$d(a) \in [1,2]$$


$$d(b) \in [1,2]$$

$$d(c) \in [2.5,3]$$

$$d(g) \in [0.5,0.5]$$


$$d(d,x,y) \in [0,\infty)$$

Safety properties



- Many properties can be expressed as relative orderings of events
- Example:
 - **g** must fire before **d** after having fired **x**
- “Good traces”
- “Bad traces”

System model




- Timed Transition system
 - Transition system
 - Min/Max delay bounds
- $d(a) \in [1,2]$
 - $d(b) \in [1,2]$
 - $d(c) \in [2.5,3]$
 - $d(g) \in [0.5,0.5]$
 - $d(d,x,y) \in [0,\infty)$
- Lazy Transition system

From absolute to relative timing


From absolute to relative timing

- Firing times depend on the enabling and the delays
- Enabling information can be extracted from a trace:
 - Event Structure (ES)
 - An ES covers other traces *modulo* concurrency
 - Key notion: **enabling compatibility**
- Timing analysis on an ES:
 - Relative timing relations \Rightarrow Timed ES
- Main result: **only traces enabling compatible with the timed ES exist in the timed domain**


Enabling information



Enabling information




- An event e can only become enabled at the time another event e' fires (e' triggers e)




- The order of the enabling implies the firing times of the events



Timing consistent trace



Event structure from a trace





Enabling compatibility




Trace and event structure are
enabling compatible

Enabling compatibility




Timing analysis (time separation)

- McMillan, Dill (1992): min/max constraints in acyclic graphs
- Hulgaard, Burns (1994): max constraints for cyclic graphs with choice
- Chakraborty (1997): linear constraints and approximate methods





Timing analysis (time separation)



From absolute to
relative timing !



Enabling compatibility & Timing consistency



Enabling compatibility & Timing consistency





Theorem:

A trace is timing consistent *iff* it is an enabling compatible trace of the **timed** event structure



State space refinement by timing constraints: enabling compatible product

Enabling compatibility





Enabling compatible

Enabling compatibility




Not enabling compatible


State space partition





State space partition



State space partition & Timing analysis





State space partition & Timing analysis




Timing analysis

State space partition & Timing analysis




Timing analysis


State space partition & Timing analysis




State space partition & Timing analysis



State space partition & Timing analysis




State space partition & Timing analysis




Overall verification approach

Verification approach




Symbolic
state space exploration
and
failure detection

Verification approach: iterative refinement




- Failure trace
- Event structure




- Timing analysis
- Composition

Verification approach: iterative refinement





- Failure trace
- Event structure





- Timing analysis
- Composition



Verification approach: iterative refinement





Verification approach: iterative refinement




Verification approach: iterative refinement



Verification approach: iterative refinement




Verification approach: back-annotation




Back-annotation: sufficient timing constraints

Verification approach: flow




Verification approach: convergence




Experimental results

Experiments: gate decompositions

- Complex-gate decompositions in *Speed-Independent* asynchronous circuits :
 - Robust hazard-free operation regardless of gate delays




Hazard-free



Non hazard-free
Unless timing assumptions

Experiments: set-up

- Verification of asynchronous control circuits
- Library delays assigned to gates
- Closed system: circuit vs. specification



- Verification:
 - Input-output conformance w.r.t. the specification
 - Absence of internal hazards

Experiments: results

<i>name</i>	<i>gates</i>	<i>untimed</i>	<i>failure</i>	<i>iters.</i>	<i>correct ?</i>	<i>CPU</i>
sbuf-read-ctl	10	74	16	3	Y	1
rcv-setup	6	78	34	2	N	1
alloc-outbound	11	82	20	4	Y	3
ebergen	9	83	22	1	N	1
mp-forward-pkt	8	186	70	8	Y	5
dff	6	255	164	6	N	2
half	7	227	133	1	N	1
chu133	9	288	204	2	N	1
converta	12	408	244	10	N	12
nowick	10	510	292	4	Y	3
chu150	8	520	339	3	N	1
sbuf-send-ctl	13	1592	1081	18	N	54
rpddf	8	2612	1841	2	N	2
sbuf-send-pkt2	13	4544	4044	19	Y	103
vme	15	10568	8655	21	N	30
sbuf-ram-write	15	14016	12362	34	N	415
ram-read-sbuf	16	19328	17488	36	N	550
mr1	16		11574	29	N	317
mr0	20		642291	2	N	48
tsend-bm	12		717561	3	N	185
trimos-send	24		1.8 E6	1	N	127
mmu	22		5.2 E6	3	N	480

TranSyT

- PIII 866MHz
- 1GB RAM
- 256MB peak
- No specific strategy
- Back-annotation

Experiments: results comparison

<i>name</i>	<i>untimed</i>	<i>iters.</i>	<i>CPU</i>	<i>CPU</i>
sbuf-read-ctl	74	3	1	1
rcv-setup	78	2	1	1
alloc-outbound	82	4	3	1
ebergen	83	1	1	1
mp-forward-pkt	186	8	5	1
dff	255	6	2	1
half	227	1	1	1
chu133	288	2	1	1
converta	408	10	12	1
nowick	510	4	3	1
chu150	520	3	1	1
sbuf-send-ctl	1592	18	54	1
rpddf	2612	2	2	1
sbuf-send-pkt2	4544	19	103	3
vme	10568	21	30	1
sbuf-ram-write	14016	34	415	32
ram-read-sbuf	19328	36	550	826
mr1	21076	29	317	Memory
mr0	727304	2	48	Memory
tsend-bm	763608	3	185	Memory
trimos-send	2.1 E6	1	127	Memory
mmu	5.6 E6	3	480	Memory

OpenKronos

(Bozga et al. 2002):

- Timed automata
- Discrete *clocks* as counters
- NDDs
- UltraSparc
- 2GB RAM !
- No back-annotation


PART III

Compositional verification

- IPCMOS architecture
- Verification of IPCMOS pipelines
 - Strategy
 - Abstractions
 - Assume-Guarantee and induction
 - Results


Goal

GOAL: Formal verification of a complex timed design (IPCMOS architecture)




IPCMOS architecture

General IPCMOS architecture





- **Pulse-based** asynchronous clocking technique for large devices operating at GHz frequencies
- Block-level interlocking scheme \Rightarrow scalable
- Schuster, et al. (IBM) ISSCC 2000

Linear IPCMOS pipeline architecture




- 2-phase request (**VALID**) and acknowledge (**ACK**) protocol
- **VALID** : data is available to the next block, mimics delay of the logic
- **ACK** : data received by the next block
- Performance up to 4GHz (year 2000 technology)
- Correctness depends on pulse widths


Two-stage pipeline at work



Stage building blocks




Strobe circuit




- Capture a negative pulse at **VALID** from the previous stage and produce a positive pulse at **ACK** to the next stage and a negative pulse at **CLKE** to the functional unit

Strobe circuit





- Transition relations:
 - $En(Y+) : \neg Y \cdot \neg Z$
 - $En(Y-) : Y \cdot ACK$
 - ...
- Failure conditions:
 - Shortcut at Y : $\neg Z \cdot ACK$
 - ...

Reset circuit



- Capture a positive pulse at **ACK** from the next stage and produce a positive pulse at **CLKR** and a negative pulse at **CLKRN** to reset both the strobe and valid circuits


Valid circuit



- Capture negative pulses at **CLKE** and produce a negative pulse at **VALID**. The pulse is reset by a positive pulse at **CLKR**
- Delay after the inverter mimics the delay of the functional block controlled by the stage

Verification of IPCMOS pipelines


Verification goal



- Assuming data-path is correct, the pipeline is correct (spec.):
 - $S = \text{“Every data fed into the pipeline is acknowledged once and only once at every stage”}$
- S is modeled by a deadlock condition plus correctness of CMOS circuits: no short-circuits, etc.
- Correctness regardless of the length of the pipeline


$$IN \parallel I_1 \parallel \dots \parallel I_n \parallel OUT \leq S, n \geq 1$$

Assume-Guarantee verification




- Pnueli 1984, Clarke et al. 1989, etc.
- Abstractions to overcome complexity: **preserve the input/output behavior and the properties of interest**
- Assume** the abstractions are correct
- Prove that the abstractions are correct to **guarantee** a sound analysis

Verification strategy



- Key observation:
 - Pulse-based communication only at the extremes
 - Internal communication is time-independent, *i.e.* 2-phase handshaking
- Allows:
 - Untimed abstractions
 - Assume-guarantee




Verification strategy




- A_{in} and A_{out} are untimed abstractions that hide the pulse-based behavior
- **Assume:** pose verification in terms of: $A_{in} \parallel A_{out} \leq S$
- **Guarantee** soundness of the abstractions:

$$IN \parallel I_1 \parallel \dots \parallel I_n \parallel OUT \leq A_{in} \parallel A_{out}$$
- Prove correctness of a one-stage pipeline






Abstractions



Assume-guarantee strategy



- Assume: $A_{in} \parallel A_{out} \leq S$
- Guarantee correctness of A_{out}
- Guarantee correctness of A_{in}
- Guarantee correctness of A_{in} (induction)
- Guarantee correctness of 1-stage: $IN \parallel I \parallel OUT \leq S$



Assume-guarantee: results

	CPU time	Refinements	
$A_{in} \parallel A_{out} \leq S$	1m	--	$A_{in} \text{ --- } A_{out}$
$A_{in} \parallel I \parallel OUT \leq A_{in} \parallel A_{out}$	28m	7	$A_{in} \text{ --- } \begin{array}{ c } \hline A_{out} \\ \hline I \text{ --- } OUT \\ \hline \end{array}$
$IN \parallel I \parallel A_{out} \leq A_{in} \parallel A_{out}$	9m	3	$\begin{array}{ c } \hline A_{in} \\ \hline IN \text{ --- } I \\ \hline \end{array} \text{ --- } A_{out}$
$A_{in} \parallel I \parallel A_{out} \leq A_{in} \parallel A_{out}$	10m	3	$\begin{array}{ c } \hline A_{in} \\ \hline A_{in} \text{ --- } I \\ \hline \end{array} \text{ --- } A_{out}$
$IN \parallel I \parallel OUT \leq S$	35m	40	$IN \text{ --- } I \text{ --- } OUT$

PART IV

Conclusions and future work

Conclusions

- New technique for the verification of timed systems
 - Relative timing
 - Avoids generating the exact timed state space
 - Symbolic methods \Rightarrow bigger systems
- Key notion: enabling compatibility
 - Timing added on-demand: Incremental refinement
 - Back-annotation: sufficient conditions for correctness
- Combined with compositional reasoning to overcome complexity: IPCMOS case study

Publications

- “Formal Verification of Safety Properties in Timed Circuits”, Int. Conf. on Advanced Research in Asynchronous Circuits and Systems (ASYNC), 2000.
- “A Case Study for the Verification of Complex Timed Circuits: IPCMOS”, Design Automation and Test Europe (DATE), 2002.
- “Relative timing based verification of concurrent systems”, Ph.D. Forum at Design Automation and Test Europe (DATE), 2003.

Future work

- Improvements:
 - Study sensibility to selection of traces, ESs, ...
 - Consider OR-causality in ESs, timing analysis, ...
 - Faster convergence and better back-annotation
 - Enabling compatible product: critical for performance
- Long-term:
 - Beyond safety properties, temporal logic, ...
 - Automatic derivation of symbolic timing constraints
 - Hierarchical verification and compositional reasoning

Questions?

